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Finitude of Capitalism and the Perverse 
Charm of Denial
Heiko Feldner and Fabio Vighi1
Abstract: In this essay we adopt a dual lens approach to argue that we live in an 
epoch of generalised perversion, to be intended as a time dominated by a collec-
tive strategy of denial vis-à-vis the valorisation crisis of contemporary capitalism 
and the attendant loss of symbolic efficiency of the “work society”. Following 
Marx’s insights into the de-socialising character of the capitalist economy, and 
Lacan’s discussions of the epistemic alliance between the discourse of modern 
science and the discourse of capitalism, we argue that understanding the delu-
sive lure of denial is particularly urgent today, when the crisis of our mode of 
production threatens the devastating implosion of social life. The historical par-
adox we emphasise is that denial functions more and more as a “spontaneous” 
psychic compromise aimed at negotiating the anxiety generated by the valorisa-
tion deadlock of contemporary capitalism. The absurdity of our condition is that, 
to a spiralling productive capacity facilitated by technological innovation, there 
corresponds a drastically decreased ability to generate wealth as value in capi-
talist terms, which dramatically weakens the socio-symbolic narrative in which 
we dwell. Our perspective advocates the necessity to establish a connection with 
the symptomatic character of the crisis rather than rely on the delusion that cap-
italism possesses the ability to renew itself eternally. While in the first part of the 
essay we examine, via Lacan, the role of denial in negotiating the historical un-
folding of the capitalist discourse, in the second part we dissect, within broader 
debates on green capitalism, the symptomatic management of the eco-economic 
catastrophe as it unfolds before our eyes.
1 Heiko Feldner and Fabio Vighi are co-directors of the Centre for Ideology 
Critique and Žižek Studies at Cardiff University. Their joint work includes 
Critical Theory and the Crisis of Contemporary Capitalism (Bloomsbury 2015), 
States of Crisis and Post-Capitalist Scenarios (Ashgate 2014), Žižek: Beyond Fou-
cault (Palgrave 2007) and Did Somebody Say Ideology? On Slavoj Žižek and Con-
sequences (CSP 2007).
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Introduction
The present essay articulates the claim that denial should be regarded as a central ontological category of contemporary life. Drawing on 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, we understand denial both as the elementary 
enabler of subjectivity and as a collective strategy of disavowal that sets 
up a socially binding discourse. In respect of the latter, we are interest-
ed in the forms of negation at work in contemporary capitalist society. 
While we acknowledge that a degree of denial is ontologically necessary, 
at the same time we contend that its epochal crystallisation in modes 
of disavowal vis-à-vis capital’s value-creation capacity, bears potentially 
catastrophic consequences. We therefore want to investigate the partic-
ular role played by the delusive lure of denial in shoring up our social 
link insofar as it is increasingly crippled by the systemic exhaustion of the 
capitalist mode of production. As we contextualise it, denial relates to the 
inherent contradiction that, in our current predicament, undermines the 
perceived efficiency of capitalism as a socio-historical formation based 
on the dominance of the economy over the rational organisation of so-
cial relations. Following Marx, we view capitalism as a “de-socialising 
social formation”: a form of social reproduction increasingly asserted as 
a theology and inherently detached from the collective interests of the 
world it shapes. For this reason, understanding the discourse of denial 
is particularly urgent today, when the crisis of our mode of production 
threatens the devastating implosion of social life. Put differently, it is in 
times of crisis like ours that denial, qua ontological category, acquires 
decisive socio-political connotations.  
Our dialectical reading of crisis invokes both subject and social sub-
stance (social link, discourse) as two sides of the same ontological coin, as 
such deeply interrelated and inseparable. The philosophical tradition we 
uphold in our approach to crisis is the one connecting Hegel’s dialectical 
method of enquiry to Marx’s critique of political economy. However, it 
is through the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan that we bring the 
Hegelo-Marxian link to bear on its fundamental dialectical presupposi-
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tions. This is because Lacanian psychoanalysis allows us to grasp and ex-
plore the “libidinal fit” between subject and substance, inasmuch as this 
fit is secured by unconscious formations (symptoms) that are ultimate-
ly responsible for what we name “denial”. In other words, our subjec-
tive inseparability from our social substance (our “world”) is validated 
through symptomatic modes of attachment embodying our blindness to 
such inseparability. 
In an effort to bring back the notion of dialectical totality within a cultur-
al and political constellation dominated by the ideologically disingenu-
ous and deeply delusional affirmation of difference and pluralism under 
capitalist conditions, we aim to foreground denial as an intrapsychic and 
collective mechanism intrinsic to the self-destructive reproduction of our 
social formation in crisis. The issue at stake is not only the progressive 
erosion of our socio-symbolic space and political horizon as consubstan-
tial with economic crisis, but especially the contemporary subject’s wilful 
inability to recognise the internal limit of that colossal apparatus for the 
“self-valorisation of value” we call capitalism. Taking Marx’s critique fur-
ther, we argue that what is ubiquitously disavowed today is the knowl-
edge of the irreversible historical failure of the alchemic capitalist expedi-
ent that converts human labour into value, thus giving form to the specific 
alienating substance of our world. The enigma of our time, we claim, lies 
in this pervasive denial of the implosive socio-ontological trajectory of con-
temporary capitalism as rooted in the valorisation of wage labour. 
While Lacan and Marx devoted their lives to the study of seemingly 
unrelated aspects of the human condition, they shared a profound con-
cern with the crisis of capitalist modernity: Marx critically dissected the 
totalising discourse of capital in order to denounce its self-destructive in-
consistency, and Lacan focussed on the implosive trajectory of the social 
discourse that supports the post-metaphysical subject. Although we are 
by no means advocating a “shotgun marriage” between the two think-
ers, we are interested in their common preoccupation with the structural 
breach that is coterminous with the history of capitalism. In what follows, 
we track Lacan’s arguments on the “epistemic alliance” between capital-
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ism and modern science in order to substantiate our Marxian analysis of 
the current crisis, looking in particular at the innovation paradox of green 
capitalism. In five steps, we seek to demonstrate how denial increasingly 
manifests itself through systemically conservative strategies of perversion, 
which enables us to throw fresh light on the perverse core of crisis man-
agement today. Our perspective advocates the necessity to establish a con-
nection with the symptomatic character of the crisis rather than rely on the 
illusion that capitalism possesses the ability to renew itself ad infinitum.   
1. In the beginning was the scientific drive
Needless to say, Lacan was not a Marxist. However, or perhaps because of 
this, he was able to think through some of the most crucial consequences 
of Marx’s insights into the capitalist mode of production and the value 
form. To the extent that, in the early 1970s, he spoke of a “discourse of 
the Capitalist” capable of revolutionising the rotatory logic of the four 
discourses he had previously devised (Master, Hysteric, University and 
Analyst). But what was the purpose of Lacan’s discursive theory? Primar-
ily, to capture the function of negativity, i.e. contradiction, in the dialec-
tical constitution of a given social link. In the late 1960s, Lacan began to 
theorise his version of discourse as a dialectical structure characterised by
the disruptive negativity of the unconscious enjoyment (jouissance) at its 
core. At its simplest, discourse for Lacan is the battleground between forc-
es of preservation (the field of the Symbolic), and the peculiar contingen-
cy of the very ground from which these forces emerge, which they can 
never fully shake off (the Real). There is, however, no victor in this battle, 
since for Lacan the Symbolic and the Real are ultimately consubstantial. 
Indeed, from his perspective the most insidious illusion for humankind 
resides in the temptation to abolish one of these two sides in order to af-
firm the autonomy of the other. 
Though Marx would hardly have considered himself a forerunner of 
psychoanalysis, he was in fact concerned with the Lacanian battlefield 
where symbolisation is antagonised by the Real. The critique of capital 
that we are interested in is one that begins with the acknowledgment 
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that the ‘real abstraction’ (Sohn-Rethel 1978) called value, which Marx 
exposed so powerfully, originates in a conflict that he himself caught a 
glimpse of, but was unable to place at the centre of his reflections. Lacan, 
particularly in Seminar XVI (From an Other to the other, 1968-69) and XVII 
(The other side of psychoanalysis, 1969-70), worked out the silent presuppo-
sitions of Marx’s own critical discourse. That is to say, he showed how 
value is the specific capitalist abstraction rooted in the valorisation of 
human labour intended as savoir-faire, or unconscious knowledge. Lacan, 
then, took on the challenge of Marx’s critique by supplementing it with 
two crucial observations: human labour as the substance of economic val-
ue is inextricably linked to a “knowledge that does not know itself” (the 
unconscious), and the capitalist revolution is fundamentally concerned 
with the spoliation of this knowledge from the worker. Put differently, 
the totalising abstraction performed by the Capitalist discourse sets itself 
the historical task of abolishing the troubling yet also potentially eman-
cipatory Real of the human condition by converting it into a value that 
has to appear countable and quantifiable in order to be exchanged prof-
itably. However, Lacan highlights that, despite its cleverness, this ruse 
might have a shorter life-span than we may reasonably assume.2 But why 
should it implode? Let us begin from the beginning, i.e. from the histor-
ical episteme in which, for Lacan, the capitalist function is nestled: the 
“knowledge discourse” of modern science.
According to Lacan, modern science emerges through a momentous 
shift from the Master discourse to what he calls the University discourse, 
where the master-signifier (the commanding signifier responsible for 
symbolic efficiency) is repressed, i.e. pushed down into the place of the 
unconscious truth; it is from there, as unconscious truth, that S1 (the 
master-signifier) keeps operating. This means that modern science is sus-
tained by an “epistemological drive” whose paradoxical satisfaction lies 
in amassing knowledge that always reveals itself to be insufficient, and 
2 As he remarks in his Milan talk of 1972, the discourse of the Capitalist is ‘fol-
lement astucieux, mais voué à la crevaison’ (Lacan 1978: 48): wildly clever, but 
headed for a blowout.
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therefore unable to appease the underlying “commandment to know”. 
For this reason, science (like capitalism) is destined not to have a human 
face, no matter how hard we try to confer ethical status on its practice. 
In this respect, Lacan’s University discourse epitomises the ambiguous 
dimension of modern science, the “back and front” of its epistemology. 
On the one hand, it tells us that science endorses the Real of jouissance 
(as a pulsating drive towards inextinguishable knowledge); on the other 
hand, it also affirms the triumph of the impersonal, neutral, objective and 
encyclopaedic knowledge that, as Lacan slyly remarks, is of the same 
kind as the one exchanged in the academia (Lacan 2007: 197-208). The 
“epistemological turn” performed by the scientific revolution is there-
fore contingent upon the structural exclusion of S1, which leaves S2 (sup-
posedly neutral and objective knowledge) in the position of command, 
while S1 becoming stealthily operative as a drive. 
Our Lacanian hypothesis here is that the Real of the new scientific 
discourse that began to emerge around the 17th century was able to re-
produce itself within a social link by anchoring itself to the capitalist 
mode of production, which started to operate, as Lacan claims, through 
the systematic conversion of the Real of human labour into value. We 
argue, then, that initially the new economic discourse qua mode of so-
cio-economic reproduction provided a degree of balance to the intrinsi-
cally traumatic breach opened up by modern science. Having emerged 
alongside the very epistemological turn of modern science, the capitalist 
discourse effectively activated a new “metaphysics of desire” that at least 
partly neutralised the unsettling novelty of the new scientific paradigm. 
Such operation hinged on a fetishistic ruse that, one might surmise, 
caught up like wildfire: the commodification of every aspect of human 
experience, beginning with the valorisation of labour. From that moment 
on, the meaning of the ‘metabolic interaction’ between man and nature 
(Marx 1976: 283 and 637-8) changed drastically, as the veritable tsunami 
caused by the new scientific discourse found its own self-mediation in 
that “secular cult” later named capitalism (see Benjamin 2004). While art, 
religion and politics became increasingly subordinated to the new eco-
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nomic regime of compulsive extraction of surplus-values, the latter laid 
the groundwork for a new theology where human belief concerns the 
‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ (Marx 1976: 163) of the 
value-form, rather than a suprasensible God. 
It is crucial to stress that Lacan’s critique of the modern epistemology 
of scientific objectivity is also, in one and the same move, a critique of 
the capitalist axiom of “labour valorisation”. This is to say that scientif-
ic objectivity is, for Lacan, inextricably linked to the advent of the new 
economic paradigm. When, however, he confronts the unconscious di-
mension of science, Lacan endorses an epistemology that does not shirk 
but fully assumes the contradictory nature of the Real, which makes sci-
ence indifferent to any ideological appropriation or systematisation. It is 
clearly this second understanding of science that Lacan links up with his 
psychoanalytic project (for example, in his use of formalised structures) 
as a “return to Freud”, inasmuch as it is constructed on the inerasable 
antagonism of the Real (or the Freudian death-drive). 
In various parts of his Seminar, Lacan refers to the traumatic nature 
of the scientific revolution, for instance when he discusses the cabbalistic 
paradox in Isaac Newton. If on the one hand, as Lacan puts in Seminar 
XII, Newton achieved the ‘decisive expulsion from the heavens […] of 
any divine shadow’ (Lacan 1964-65, lesson of 12 May 1965), on the other 
hand he went rummaging through sacred texts, hoping to throw light on 
the mystery of divine creation, as stated in Seminar XVI: ‘Newton too, 
who had other things to think about, produced a big book […] which is a 
comment on the Apocalypse and on Daniel’s prophecy’ (Lacan 1968-69, 
lesson of 12 February 1969). Or, again from Seminar XII: ‘the gravitation-
al operation did not seem, to him [Newton], capable of being supported 
by anything but this pure and supreme subject, this sort of distillation 
of the ideal subject, which is the Newtonian God’ (Lacan 1964-65, lesson 
of 12 May 1965). Such “taking shelter” in religious texts goes a long way 
in explaining the difficulties initially encountered by the scientific dis-
course in damming its own tumultuous drive.3 
3 In Seminar XI (The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis), Lacan (1998a: 
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If Newton’s famous methodological principle Hypotheses non fingo (I 
do not pretend to have any hypotheses; I only rely on formulas that de-
scribe phenomena, without looking for inner causes), can be legitimately 
regarded as the “epistemological cut” that brought the scientific signi-
fiers to the level of the Real, Lacan notes that this mutation could only 
subsist by virtue of the (more or less silent) presupposition of the Other’s 
efficiency (Lacan 1998b: 141-42). In brief, modern science for Lacan (1968-
69, lesson of 30 April 1969) makes its first steps within a ‘theological en-
velope’, relying on a transcendental mechanism in order to attempt to 
secure for itself a degree of socio-symbolic consistency.4 Within a new 
scientific paradigm where the figure of a God-guarantor (as Descartes 
had it) is far from immediately relinquished, the subject of psychoanaly-
sis asserts itself as “internally external” to science. It belongs to the same 
(scientific) paradigm, but the hypothesis it operates with is precisely the 
one negated by science, that is to say, the existence of the subject of the 
unconscious, which is proven by the way language functions. As Lacan 
(1998b: 142) puts it: ‘It is because there is the unconscious […] that the 
signifier can be called upon to constitute a sign.’ The psychoanalytic cri-
tique that Lacan levels at the Capitalist discourse concerns precisely, as 
we shall see, the distortion of the unconscious qua missing cause – a dis-
tortion that takes the name of valorisation. Such distortion amounts to a 
fetishistic substitution that installs the new regime of abstract labour.
2. Foreclosure and the Capitalist discourse
Lacan claims that modern science tends to “suture” (reject, radically ex-
clude) the subject of psychoanalysis (the unconscious) in order to estab-
lish itself as a rational enterprise intended as adaequatio rei et intellectus 
(correspondence between reason and thing). This epochal attempt to 
152) claims that despite the revolutions of Descartes and Newton, Comte’s 
positivism still hangs on to ‘a religious theory of the earth as a great fetish.’
4 Perhaps, then, it is not accidental that, when Einstein was confronted with 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, his often-quoted rejoinder was: ‘God 
does not play dice with the universe.’
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remove the subject of the unconscious is not, for him, without serious 
structural consequences. First of all, because in this way science prevents 
itself from getting in touch with its own truth as cause,5  i.e. its drive, 
which is precisely what psychoanalysis aims for: to bring about the sub-
ject as symptom, which in turn allows for a momentary separation from 
the Other, thus opening the way to the potential reconfiguration of sub-
jective identity. Scientific determinism is therefore founded on the rejec-
tion of the unconscious qua cause; or, which amounts to the same thing, 
on the exclusion of impossibility from its closed network of causes and 
effects. 
Another way of putting this is by claiming that the scientific discourse 
forecloses symbolic castration. What is rejected in forclusion (Lacan’s 
translation of Freud’s term Verwerfung) is the master-signifier, the signifi-
er of castration, which secures the symbolic efficiency of the Other, there-
by supporting subjectivity: ‘What is at issue when I speak of Verwerfung? 
At issue is the rejection of a primordial signifier into the outer shadows, 
a signifier that will henceforth be missing at that level. Here you have 
the fundamental mechanism that I posit as being at the basis of paranoia’ 
(Lacan 1997: 150). Lacan, then, reads scientific knowledge as intrinsically 
conducive to the formation of the psychotic structure. More precisely, 
the discourse of modern science tends to set up, and rely on, a paranoid 
type of subjectivity, as such troubled by the perception of the intrusion 
of a malevolent Other. Although the acquisition of any knowledge for La-
can is intrinsically relatable to paranoia, since it is attained through imag-
inary identification with an Other that “returns” after being repressed, 
he suggests that the discourse of modern science exacerbates the elemen-
tary delusional mechanism at work in identity formation. 
The paranoiac subject of science wants a fully transparent, legible and 
quantifiable Other; that is to say, he wants to eliminate the disturbing oth-
erness of the Other, the substantial negativity that constitutes its enigma 
5 In ‘Science and Truth’ Lacan (2006: 742) claims that ‘our science’s prodigious 
fecundity must be examined in relation to the fact, sustaining science, that 
science does-not-want-to-know-anything about the truth as cause.’
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory  |  Vol. 2, No. 2 (April, 2018)108
as set up by the mechanism of symbolic castration. Having rejected S1 
(the signifier of castration), the paranoiac is convinced that he is con-
fronted by an intrinsically malignant Other. For this reason, any per-
ceived inconsistency in the Other is turned by the paranoiac into proof 
of its evil enjoyment at tormenting him. Lacan’s formula is very clear: 
‘whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung 
[foreclosure], reappears in the real’ (Lacan 1997: 13). Therein lies the differ-
ence between repression and foreclosure: if in repression the formations 
of the unconscious return in the Symbolic – i.e. the content of what is 
repressed remains articulated within the signifying chain of language 
– in foreclosure these returns are only possible in the Real, insofar as 
symbolic castration does not work as a dialectical mechanism of psy-
chic stabilisation. Succinctly put, in the psychotic structure the subject is 
fully exposed to his inability to neutralise the raw immediacy of reality 
through language. In psychosis, language is deprived of its anchorage 
in the unconscious, which prevents it from being “naturalised” into that 
fictional screen (the Other) that structures our perception of the mean-
ingfulness of reality. 
What we are keen to develop, in this context, is the relationship be-
tween the Lacanian point concerning the psychotic tendencies within 
the discourse of modern science, and our argument that the Capitalist 
discourse originates in the same episteme as that of modern science as 
an attempt to counterbalance it, that is to say to recuperate a dialectical 
rapport with the Other which, as we shall see, at its most elementary lev-
el involves the structure of perversion. If science by definition operates 
through the suturage du sujet, therefore placing the signifier of castration 
off-limits and abolishing the subject-Other dialectic, the Capitalist dis-
course, which assumes the form of the scientific drive, desperately at-
tempts to recreate that dialectical configuration in order to conceal, ulti-
mately, its own blind, (self-)destructive dynamic of value accumulation. 
Put differently, through “commodity fetishism” the capitalist mode of 
production mobilises new psychosocial resources in order to attempt to 
fend off the trauma introduced by the drive of modern science, which 
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also continues to qualify capital’s discourse at its most basic level. If com-
modity fetishism constitutes capital’s internal, in-built contrivance for 
obtaining a minimum of transcendental cover, at the same time capital 
seeks the legitimisation of its compulsive discourse also externally. In 
this respect, the history of capitalism should also be seen as a reiterated 
endeavour to mask capital’s own automatic, indifferent and ultimately 
self-destructive dynamism through various “camouflaging aids” rang-
ing from religion to politics and ideology, whose fundamental task was 
always one of containment and validation. In its form, then, the capitalist 
discourse has never changed, for it has always been a drive, a blind com-
pulsion to repeat the same movement of self-valorisation. Our specific ar-
gument here is that today we are witnessing a remarkable epochal shift, 
whereby the capitalist drive becomes fully visible in all its might and, by 
the same token, impotence. This is because, on the one hand, the global 
triumph of capitalism decrees its inevitability as fate, and therefore the 
pointlessness of any external (political, ideological, moral, etc.) “justifi-
cationism”; but on the other hand, it also comes to coincide, historical-
ly, with its exhaustion as a mode of production. In short, in our current 
predicament global capitalism has no substantial fiction with which to 
disguise its own growing unproductivity, which is why the only defence 
mechanism at its disposal is perversion. 
3. Perverse measures for desperate times
We claim that the epoch of capitalist globalisation is the epoch of generalised 
perversion, to be intended in Lacanian terms as a time dominated by a 
specific subjective strategy of denial vis-à-vis the waning of the contem-
porary Other. The historical paradox to highlight is the following: per-
version works more and more as a “spontaneous” psychic compromise 
aimed at negotiating the suffocating anxiety generated by the crisis of the 
capitalist drive, which is increasingly unable to rely on the metaphysics 
of the value-form and related fictions. As we will expand on in the fol-
lowing sections of this essay, today’s economic crisis is, fundamentally, 
an epochal crisis of surplus-value creation. One of the ways this reveals 
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itself is as a return of the scientific drive in its “naked” epistemological al-
liance with capitalism: the third industrial revolution (digitalisation) has 
provided capital with unheard-of incentives to cut costs of production 
(variable capital, i.e. human labour), while also unwittingly curtailing 
capital’s ability to generate surplus-value and by extension profits – since 
surplus-value can only be generated by (the exploitation of) human la-
bour. We therefore suggest that the global triumph of capitalism coincides 
ever more pressingly, and alarmingly, with the intensifying of its own 
self-destructive potential, which was always inscribed in the Real of its 
drive; a Real that becomes palpable today in the emergence of capital’s 
unmediated alliance with science and technology. The absurd paradox 
of our condition is that, to a spiralling productive capacity facilitated by 
technological innovation, there corresponds a drastically decreased ca-
pacity to generate wealth as value in capitalist terms. In turn, the weak-
ness of the symbolic narrative in which capital operates indicates that per-
version is in full swing as a desperate defence mechanism. Before taking 
a closer look at the innovation paradox and its economic implications, let 
us illuminate how perversion came to be a dominant libidinal response.
The secret objective of perversion, as theorised by Lacan, is not to 
transgress the law, but to bring back its authority, to the extent that it 
must appear explicit, inflexible and indestructible – as in the exempla-
ry case of the masochist who stipulates a contract with the strict and 
uncompromising dominatrix who tortures him. The various displays of 
hyper-narcissistic exhibitionism flooding our everyday life are intrinsi-
cally perverse insofar as they betray the unconscious desire to surrender 
oneself to the gaze of the Other, with the surreptitious aim of securing 
the Other’s full satisfaction, generating the illusion of its indestructibility 
and in return safeguarding the ego (“they look at me, therefore I exist”). 
Offering oneself up to the Other is the most direct way, for a subject be-
leaguered by anxiety, to attempt to secure his or her own subjective con-
sistency. One only needs to think of the rise of the “selfie” to the status of 
global phenomenon to gain an intuitive understanding of the function of 
exhibitionism today. The constant mediatisation of life, on which today’s 
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mass exhibitionism feeds, is based on the illusion that a physical Other 
(the media gaze) can be made to exist in place of the socio-symbolic Oth-
er (the virtual gaze), which is on the way out.
Lacan argues that the main feature of the pervert is to become an in-
strument of the Other’s jouissance so as to establish or restore the Other’s 
authority. This goes a long way toward explaining why perversion is 
rife in times of crisis, as for instance in the martyrdom of the religious 
fundamentalist (in the name of a God whose authority is vacillating), or 
in the behaviour of the postmodern subject who, boasting a cynical dis-
tance from ideological lures, sacrifices all his life, body and soul, to the 
altar of God-capital. This point is made by Slavoj Žižek (2006: 127) when 
he claims that perversion is a common feature of fundamentalism and 
western neo-liberalism, insofar as it relies on positive knowledge rather 
than belief: ‘A fundamentalist does not believe, he knows it directly. Both 
liberal-sceptical cynics and fundamentalists share a basic underlying fea-
ture: the loss of the ability to believe in the proper sense of the term. What 
is unthinkable for them is the groundless decision which installs every 
authentic belief, a decision which cannot be grounded in the chain of 
reasons, in positive knowledge’.
In short, the more symbolic efficiency deteriorates under the crippling 
blows of our valorisation crisis, the more the contemporary subject re-
acts perversely, self-immolating on the altar of the Other in the attempt 
to stem its draining. Differently from the neurotic, who endeavours to 
resist the interference of a powerful and invisible law that threatens to 
gobble him up, the pervert consigns himself to the Other in a desperate 
and paradoxical attempt to achieve identification. As the pervert cannot 
count on the arsenal of signifiers available to the neurotic, he instead tries 
to restore the authority of the Other libidinally, via his own active inter-
vention in the Other’s breach. In other words, the pervert utilises his own 
libido precisely as a cork, a filler or stopgap, aiming to close the chasm in 
the weakened Other.
If in the University discourse the attempt to totalize the field of knowl-
edge encounters its limit in the tendency to produce the psychotic struc-
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ture (subjectivities unable to intercept the truth of the discourse qua fore-
closed master-signifier: S1 // $), with the advent of the capitalist nexus we 
witness the simulated potentiation of this depleted subject in the direction 
of a hyper-narcissistic personality “without unconscious”. Born out of 
the inversion of the first couple in the Master’s discourse (S1/$), the Cap-
italist discourse revolutionises the logic of the previous four discourses 
in the hope of transforming their intrinsic impotence into the productive 
engine of sociality itself. If the Master’s discourse generates an entropic 
residue approachable only via desire and fantasy ($<>a), the capitalist 
revolution proposes to valorise, produce and exchange this meaningless 
remainder, turning it into a universally achievable entity.
It is not accidental that the discourse of the Capitalist, as outlined by 
Lacan on the blackboard at Milan University, reproduces a circular, log-
ical and seemingly uninterrupted movement among its four terms, one 
that effectively simulates the closed loop of infinity (∞). 
Discourse of the Capitalist
Here lies our utopia: in the illusion of creating a horizontal movement 
of perpetual acceleration fuelled by the valorisation of the Real. Bring-
ing to completion the process of neutralisation of the Other that inspires 
the University discourse, in which it germinates, capitalism aims at the 
systematic abstraction of the Real. Its wide-open jaws require the end-
less commodification of excess, that is to say the incessant recycling, val-
orisation and ingurgitation of the Real of human labour, which Lacan, 
throughout Seminar XVII, captures with the term savoir-faire, “uncon-
scious knowledge-at-work”.
While the Capitalist discourse wants to avoid castration, at the same 
time it needs to offer the illusion of actively achieved subjective fulfil-
ment. It needs, in other words, to provide a range of objects (commodi-
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ties) to fulfil, however temporarily this may be, the subject’s desire. This 
is why at the helm of Capitalist discourse we find none other than the 
hystericized subject of the unconscious ($) qua worker-consumer. How-
ever, the structural function of this divided subject is not, as in the dis-
course of the Hysteric, to challenge the knowledge possessed by the mas-
ter-signifier ($ - S1); rather, the subject aims to readily deliver himself 
as object of the Other’s jouissance, embodied by the capitalist drive in 
the position of truth (hence the novelty of the downward vector from $ 
to S1). Put differently, the subject of capitalism morphs into a fetish to 
partake in the only structure available to him, the one hinging on capi-
talist valorisation. The aim is precisely to validate the efficiency of such 
structure so as to gain, in return, a degree of subjective consistency. This 
is where perversion lies: in the desperate willingness to make the Other 
function (rather than to function through opposition to the Other). And 
the more this capitalist Other appears weak, the more the subject self-im-
molates. This ruse entails bypassing symbolic castration, in the attempt 
to establish a social ontology founded upon a relentless act of recycling: 
the transformation/distortion of a (the senseless residue of the signifying 
operation and as such object-cause of desire in the Master’s discourse) 
into a universally countable and exchangeable value that may feed the 
capitalist’s drive ad infinitum.
If this is the case, then surplus-value qua object of the capitalist drive 
matters only insofar as it performs the role of the invisible substance 
that sustains the gravitational orbit of the drive itself. The accelerating 
movement of capital, in other words, hinges on its blindness vis-à-vis the 
composition of its founding cause, namely surplus-value. ‘Comme sur des 
roulettes’, says Lacan (1978: 36) in 1972: the discourse of the Capitalist 
runs very fast, as if on wheels, and yet… ‘it consumes itself to the point 
of consumption’ (‘ça se consomme si bien que ça se consume’). Why? Because 
the blind acceleration inherent in the dynamic of capital accumulation 
works only insofar as the discourse of the Capitalist cannot fathom its 
own driving mechanism, i.e. the necessity of the exploitation of labour 
power. Let us take a closer look at this.
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4. The innovation paradox of green capitalism
The historical shift towards perversion as a dominant libidinal response 
is not an accidental feature but an integral part of the exponentially grow-
ing destructiveness which the capital valorisation regime has exhibited 
since the 1970s. Today it manifests itself in a variety of ways. One of the 
most striking examples is the peculiar management of the eco-economic 
catastrophe which is unfolding in uncanny slow motion before our eyes. 
It ranges from the cynical socialisation of risks (“flexibility”) and costs 
(“austerity”), and the apocalyptic devaluation of the money medium 
through waves of “quantitative easing” and unbridled money creation 
more generally, to the unrelenting race for “competitive” rather than sus-
tainable energy sources (“fracking”, “clean coal”). A lesser known but all 
the more remarkable facet of this is the United Kingdom Deregulation Act. 
It came into force in March 2015, i.e. a mere six and a half years after the 
fall of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 had 
made the solemn pledge to re-regulation a rhetorical mainstay of crisis 
management. While it did not attract much limelight at the time, the De-
regulation Act constitutes a veritable piece of meta-legislation insofar as 
it makes ‘the desirability of promoting economic growth’ the ultimate 
criterion to which existing and future laws and regulations will have to 
conform (UK Deregulation Act 2015: section 108, 1). Its intent to stream-
line all areas of public life in Britain according to their contributions to 
corporate bottom lines and the GDP is in keeping not only with “trade 
agreements” like CETA, but with the corporate deregulation agenda of 
the reviled European Union more generally (see Kaucher 2015). Such cri-
sis management, lest it escapes us, includes also the fate-bribing work 
regimes we impose on ourselves, individually as well as collectively, in 
the ritual belief that such sacrifice may be needed to protect, or restore, 
the orderly course of things. 
The systemic illiteracy of the capital valorisation economy towards its 
social conditions of existence perpetuates itself most effectively in the 
shape of three powerful mythologies: first, the historical grand narrative 
115Finitude of Capitalism and the Perverse Charm of Denial
of “1989”, which interprets the unceremonious demise of communism as 
a triumph of market economics and liberal democracy; second, the uncan-
ny tale of “creative destruction” according to which only a new science 
and technology offensive can get us out of the current global economic 
crisis; and, third, the libertarian “end of work society” discourse, which 
renders the collapse of contemporary work society as a blueprint for a 
post-capitalist world beyond work. These mythologies shield us from 
the traumatic realisation of the depth of our eco-economic predicament. 
They are mutually reinforcing in their denial of the historical finitude of 
capitalism as a mode of production and way of life; a denial that speaks 
to us in many voices, from business-as-usual politics to post-apocalyptic 
voyeurism, while simultaneously oscillating between the neoliberal apo-
theosis of work on the one hand, and a hedonistic work-no-more hysteria 
on the other. In the following, we want to focus on the second mythol-
ogy, which has become ever more prominent in public policy debates 
since the current economic crisis broke out in 2007–2008.
To be sure, while the ideological battle between neoliberalism and 
neo-Keynesianism has preoccupied much political thinking during the 
past decade, it has not gone unnoticed in either camp that the choice be-
tween “austerity” and “growth” is in reality a choice between suffocating 
and drowning. In fact, there is a growing suspicion that the current crisis 
might not simply be another Schumpeterian event of ‘creative destruc-
tion’ laying the foundations for new thrusts of economic expansion (see 
Schumpeter 1942: 71ff.). Is not the ubiquitous reluctance of policymakers 
to allow the finance and sovereign debt bubbles to burst, i.e. the destruc-
tion of “bad assets” to run its course as a prerequisite for productive in-
vestment and renewed growth, a tell-tale sign of the widespread premo-
nition that the days of creative destructions – an egregious euphemism 
if ever there was one – might be numbered after all, and that “scorched 
earth” may be a more fitting metaphor for economic crisis in the 21st 
century? The 2016 report on living standards, poverty and inequality in 
Britain by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS 2016) illustrates this chang-
ing constellation. Robert Joyce, IFS associate director and co-author of 
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the report, leaves no doubt that the present economic development is 
unusual, not least because of the protracted period of depressed earnings 
since the recession of 2008: this ‘is not just unusual in international terms 
but also unusual historically for the UK. Real wages have fallen and have 
not recovered’ (quot. in Allen and Elliot 2016). Paul Johnson, the director 
of the liberal think-tank, even predicts that ‘real wages will, remarkably, 
still be below their 2008 levels in 2021. One cannot stress enough how 
dreadful that is – more than a decade without real earnings growth. [...] 
We have certainly not seen a period remotely like it in the last 70 years’ 
(quot. in FT 2016). His sobering assessment is broadly shared by a di-
verse range of institutions, such as the Federation of Trade Unions in 
England and Wales (TUC 2016), the Bank of England (Carney 2016) and 
the OECD (2016).
However, the store of illusions is inexhaustible when social formations 
fall. Jared Diamond (2006) has explained with great lucidity how histor-
ical societies like the Maya and Viking Greenland collapsed. Regardless 
of their specific trajectories, they had one important trait in common. At 
the very moment when the insight arose that their conditions of existence 
had become precarious, they began to intensify all those strategies and 
practices which, until then, had appeared successful. They continued to 
operate on the basis of past experience and practical reason, while their 
conditions of existence had fundamentally changed. Similarly, today, 
while the neoliberal and neo-Keynesian cards have both been played 
to devastating consequences, there persists the unshakeable belief that 
a new science and technology offensive would save us, that ‘growth in 
[…] the west will return when that combination of innovation and good 
capitalism is rekindled’, as Will Hutton (2012a), one of Britain’s leading 
Keynesian economists, has forcefully suggested. ‘It is the great general 
purpose technologies (GPTs) – the steam engine, the aeroplane and the 
computer – that transformed our lives and economies’, Hutton explains: 
‘In the 1930s, evolving GPTs helped drive economic recovery, aided by 
a capitalism that had been reformed after the excesses of the 1920s. Re-
covery from today’s barely contained depression will require the same 
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alchemy’ (Hutton 2012b). Hutton’s view is echoed across the globe by 
political economists and policy advisors alike (see e.g. Krugman 2013, 
Mazzucato 2014 and Stiglitz 2016). Conor D’Arcy of the British Resolu-
tion Foundation think-tank, for example, urges the necessity of a gov-
ernment strategy that stimulates productivity growth. In order to tackle 
the above-mentioned quandary of ‘Britain’s chronic low pay problem’ 
successfully, the UK needs, in addition to policies such as the national 
living wage which will aid people in the low-income spectrum, to make 
strong productivity growth ‘a central goal of government’ (D’Arcy 2016; 
see also D’Arcy and Davies 2016). 
If there is much agreement that the current calamities are in large part 
‘the result of a dysfunctional low productivity economy’ (Economists for 
Rational Economic Policies 2015: 16), few have written about this as au-
thoritatively as Nicholas Stern, the former chief economist of the World 
Bank, author of the influential Stern-Report on the economics of climate 
change (Stern 2007) and current chair of the Grantham Research Institute 
on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Eco-
nomics. In The Global Deal, he offered an accessible ‘blueprint’ of ‘how to 
manage climate change whilst creating a new era of growth and pros-
perity’ (Stern 2009a: 7), a green new deal which, since the onset of the 
economic crisis, he has further elaborated in a series of papers explaining 
the link between climate change, world poverty and economic recession. 
The results of this are summarised in his most recent book Why Are We 
Waiting? (Stern 2016). While the way we act on climate change and global 
poverty ‘will define our generation’, Stern argues, the current recession, 
severe and protracted as it may be, constitutes historically only a short-
term crisis, which must be tackled within the framework of a strategic re-
sponse to these two defining challenges of the 21st century. Furthermore, 
our current economic dilemma ‘brings the critical opportunity and the 
requirement to find a driver of long-term sustainable economic growth 
to lead us out of this crisis’, seeing that ‘we do not want again to sow the 
seeds of the next bubble as we emerge from the crash of the last’ (Stern 
2009a: 9). With the support of a global fiscal stimulus, a new generation 
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of green technologies would enable ‘new patterns of growth that can 
transform our economies and societies in much the same way as the rail-
ways, electricity, the motor car and IT did in earlier eras’. Provided that 
the green component of the stimulus is large enough, ‘this could enable 
us to grow out of this recession in a way that both reduces the risks for 
our planet and sparks off a wave of new technologies which will create 
2 or 3 decades of strong growth and a more secure, cleaner and more at-
tractive economy for all of us’ (Stern 2009a: 9 and 2009b: 195; see in detail 
Stern 2016: xxvii-xxxi, 33-88 and 93-95). 
To avoid misunderstandings, the selected passages highlight the 
linchpin of Stern’s argument, which is indicative of a broader debate 
on green capitalism (see e.g. Porritt 2012 and Mathews 2016). They do 
not reflect its complexity. What is more, in the face of unreconstructed 
climate change deniers, such as Nigel Lawson, Ian Plimer and Donald 
Trump, we could not agree more with the urgency of his call that ‘cli-
mate change is here now’ and requires joined-up and decisive action, for 
the ‘scale of emissions reduction associated with avoiding grave risks of 
climate change implies nothing short of a new energy-industrial revo-
lution’ (Stern 2014 and 2016: 33). And yet, Stern’s principal assumption 
that a new generation of green technologies would enable new patterns 
of growth that could transform our societies in the same way as railways, 
electricity, the automobile and information technology did in the past, is 
historically unfounded. 
Even though it may be galvanising and politically expedient to sug-
gest that ‘low-carbon technologies can open up new sources of growth 
and jobs’ (Stern 2009b: 5) – a belief shared by green-minded policymakers 
around the world (see e.g. Jaeger et al. 2011 and OECD 2015) – they can-
not do either. Contrary to sanguine projections from all political quarters 
(see e.g. Kaletsky 2011, McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2017 and Srniceck and 
Williams 2015), we seek to explain why a new science and technology of-
fensive cannot lead us out of our eco-economic dilemma: (1) why it pro-
vides neither a remedy for the global economic crisis, nor (2) ‘a blueprint 
for a safer planet’ (Stern 2009a) as promoters of green capitalism tend to 
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suggest; and (3) why it cannot ‘move the world economy beyond capi-
talism’ (Mason 2016: 265) in a way that would put an end to the endemic 
problems of technological unemployment and abject poverty.
Much as railroading, electrification and the fordist automobile in-
dustry did exert a dynamising effect on employment and growth in the 
19th and lengthy spells of the 20th century, this cannot be repeated his-
torically. The impact of the digital revolution, which has inaugurated 
the post-industrial era, is fundamentally different. Its unprecedented 
economic rationalisation potentials were not only a central factor in the 
breakdown of the state-capitalist labour regimes of the Soviet bloc. They 
were also the technological driver of the neoliberal turn during the 1980s, 
the global class war against the working classes, and the concomitant 
escapism into simulated (“finance-driven”) growth, which have led us 
economically to where we are today.
From a different angle, historian Robert Gordon (2016) has arrived at 
similar conclusions in his large-scale analysis of the rise and fall of eco-
nomic growth in the United States since the Civil War. Using total factor 
productivity growth as his key performance indicator – i.e. the economic 
expansion over and above the growth of capital and labour, which prior 
to the First World War stood at less than 0.5% per year, then rose in the 
1940s to over 3% and dropped after 1970 below 1%, leading to the slow-
ing growth dynamic ever since – Gordon demonstrates that the impact 
the fundamental innovations between 1870 and 1970 had on productivity 
growth, employment and the material standard of living can no longer 
be replicated. 
Whatever we might think of the nature and effectiveness of “good 
capitalism” or “sustainable growth”, capitalism cannot return to a tech-
nological infrastructure with labour-intensive production lines and full 
employment. As long as we are stuck with a regime of social reproduc-
tion contingent on the creation of surplus-value, with solipsistic business 
enterprises locked in a civil war of “competition”, neither the techno-
logical blind flight nor its social (unemployment and poverty) and eco-
nomic (revenue squeeze and economic contraction) consequences can be 
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stopped. With each and every technological innovation we will continue 
to saw remorselessly away at the branch on which we sit. But then again, 
is this not exactly the kind of brute economic determinism that makes 
a mockery of human creativity and free will? It surely is. The brutish-
ness, however, lies not in the critique but in its object. We live in a world 
of globalised economic compulsions, the most insidious of which is the 
compulsion for human beings to convert themselves into little combus-
tion engines of human energy that can be offered for hire, a fate which 
can only be borne if it is elevated to a moral virtue and aspirational way 
of life. 
5. The great denial
What, though, lends such widespread plausibility to the belief that 
technological innovation would be the driver of long-term sustainable 
growth which leads us out of the current economic crisis? We want to 
stress three problematic premises on which the plausibility of this belief 
rests. The first one is the assumption that economics would be about the 
production and distribution of goods and services in the face of scarcity 
of resources, as every economics textbook from Samuelson (1976: 3, 18) to 
Krugman and Wells (2013: 6) contends. However, within the overwhelm-
ing majority of contemporary economies – if they are indeed the subject 
of economics – the production and distribution of utility values, such as 
goods and services, is little more than an epiphenomenon subordinated 
to the procurement of exchange-value (money) and money profit.
This leads us to a second, related misconception according to which 
we would live in a market economy, with all its illusions – such as free-
dom, choice and equal opportunity – attached to it (see e.g. Stern 2016: 
95-105). In reality, the “market” is a fleeting, if crucial, episode within the 
economy of capital valorisation. It is the stage (arena and phase) where 
the surplus-value extracted through the exploitation of wage labour 
must be turned into money profit to be available for reinvestment. While 
the notion of the market economy affords us the illusion of historical 
timelessness (circularity, eternal return), the capital valorisation process 
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is characterised by a historical dynamic which does not simply repeat 
itself. The structural crises of capital valorisation are only superficially 
expressions of the ever same (“Minsky moment”, “overproduction”, 
“market adjustment”). While historically they might well have wiped the 
slate clean periodically and temporarily, they did so on an ever-increas-
ing level of productivity, which, in turn, changed each time the historical 
conditions of capital valorisation fundamentally and irrevocably. 
The belief that a new science and technology offensive could exert 
the same transformative impact on employment and economic growth 
as other general purpose technologies did in the past conflates, third-
ly, the drivers of business success with the drivers of macroeconomic 
prosperity. Indeed, from the viewpoint of the business enterprise, tech-
nological innovation and rationalisation are the drivers of profitability 
and economic expansion. From the viewpoint of the capital valorisation 
economy as a whole, however, this is not necessarily the case. Why not? 
Because surplus-value is a social category, as Marx points out in volume 
three of Capital. Individual businesses do not produce it in the same way 
as they produce cars, computers or other goods and services. In fact, the 
surplus-value created by individual businesses is not a verifiable proper-
ty of any single commodity they produce. Rather, it aggregates with the 
surplus-value created by other businesses to form the total social mass 
of surplus-value in existence at any given time. The individual com-
modities represent the spectral, socio-symbolic materiality of this social 
mass of surplus-value. Just how much of this mass an individual busi-
ness manages to capture, however, depends on its competitiveness in the 
market place, which in turn is an expression of its technological capacity 
to cut labour costs – i.e. to displace human labour and thereby the only 
source of surplus-value – while forcing others to follow suit. Paradoxi-
cally, then, the businesses, which most successfully harness the spirit of 
innovation, are the ones that undermine the social mass of surplus-value, 
and with it the general foundation for employment and long-term sus-
tainable growth, the most. 
In light of where we are today, a new science and technology offen-
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sive can therefore yield the desired results merely for a short period 
and only for some, while directly or indirectly pulling the plug on all 
the rest. Those who are able to bolster their technological competitive-
ness through economic (common markets and currency zones) and ex-
tra-economic violence (global governance and warfare) will control the 
remaining isles of prosperity. Here we can catch a glimpse of why Stern’s 
forceful plea that ‘the developed world must demonstrate for all, espe-
cially the developing world, that low-carbon growth is not only possible, 
but that it can be a productive, efficient and attractive route to overcome 
world poverty’, that ‘it is indeed the only sustainable route’ (Stern 2009: 
8), might send shivers down the spine of many. Ultimately, any green 
new deal remains doomed to fail as long as the gap between work to be 
had and work to be done keeps growing before our eyes.
If the third industrial revolution spells the end of the state-centred as 
well as the market-centred syntheses of the capital valorisation economy, 
what about the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ most vigorously advocated 
by the founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, 
Klaus Schwab (2016)? What are the prospects that artificial general intel-
ligence technologies evolving at exponential speed will usher in a col-
laborative economic system beyond capitalism as Jeremy Rifkin (2011 
and 2014) and Paul Mason (2015) suggest? Under the present conditions, 
this is most unlikely. Even though we contend that it is the compulsive 
historical development of the forces of production that ultimately seals 
the fate of capitalism as a system capable of reproducing social life, we 
do not share the belief in technological determinism that is rapidly gain-
ing ground in futuristic debates. Techno-utopian visions tend to obfus-
cate the fact that the development of the productive forces is not some 
natural, or socially neutral, technology-driven process. Far from being 
techno-driven, the character, extent and direction of this development 
is primarily determined by the socio-pathological form of the capital-
ist mode of production itself. This has two important implications: first, 
the deterministic conviction that, under the conditions of a freewheel-
ing market economy, everything that can be developed technologically 
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would ultimately be developed, is historically unfounded. By the same 
token, second, we have no reason to assume that the development of 
modern productive forces, such as ‘the Internet of Things [...] driven by 
extreme productivity’, would quasi-automatically bring about ‘a Collab-
orative Commons as the dominant model for organizing economic life’ 
(Rifkin 2014: 16) if helped along by smart policy frameworks, rhizomatic 
networks and all-out democratisation of social life (Mason 2016: 217-292; 
see also McChesney and Nichols 2016: 245-276). What both Rifkin’s and 
Mason’s illuminating accounts of the current technological transforma-
tion fail to consider is the self-referential expansion of abstract wealth as 
the formative matrix and developmental driver of modern capitalist so-
ciety. While there is no reason to throw the baby out along with the bath-
water and peddle some techno-phobic agenda, it is important to bear in 
mind that under the current conditions, with the ever tightening noose 
of the value-form around their necks, modern societies can do little more 
but accelerate their own disintegration into dystopian war-lord regimes 
(“work societies without work”) when they are reformatted by a fourth 
“industrial” AI revolution.
For all their differences and incongruities, what the above projections 
have in common with Nicholas Stern’s blueprint for a safer planet is the 
unswerving belief that the capitalist mode of production possesses the 
miraculous ability to renew itself eternally, unless it meets with an in-
surmountable external limit, such as the ecological finitude of earth, or 
is opposed and overthrown. Whatever their suspicions and doubts, they 
hold on to the belief, elegantly expressed in Anatole Kaletsky’s Capital-
ism 4.0 (2011), that the current crisis is but another instance of “creative 
destruction”, which sooner or later will give birth to a new model of 
economic growth, provided we are smart enough. The common ground 
that makes this unintended alliance possible is the utopian vision of a 
universal social order without a symptom. As we have seen, this is pre-
cisely our Lacanian point about the structural overlap between science 
and capitalism: what both discourses aim at is the delusional foreclo-
sure of the substantial negativity that inheres in any social ontology. This 
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non-castrated utopia is rapidly turning into the collective nightmare of a 
social constellation unable to connect with its own cause. 
In contrast to the perverse scenario that befits our times, we champion 
an alternative view of the current crisis, which can be summed up as fol-
lows. As a system of social reproduction, capitalism has not only entered 
its deepest crisis since World War Two, but has reached its developmen-
tal limit and is in terminal decline. Its demise does not depend on a cata-
clysmic breach of planetary boundaries (‘limits to growth’) or the rise of a 
political force that would overthrow it, as is widely presumed across the 
political spectrum. Nor does its decline in itself usher in a new social or-
der, far from it. Capitalism’s historic disintegration, which we experience 
today, is the irreversible result of its own intrinsic dynamic. It is caused, 
in essence, by the vanishing capacity to generate new surplus-value — 
the life blood and telos of capital valorisation economies (see e.g. Kurz 
2016, Jappe 2017 and Žižek 2017). As a consequence, ever-larger parts 
of the world will be condemned to permanent unproductivity (“under-
development”) and the fate of a surplus humanity drowning in survival 
(“unemployment”). However, while post-capitalist formations can no 
longer be based on the valorisation of human labour, we argue that the 
replacement of capitalism through hedonistic “work-no-more” utopias is 
both impossible and undesirable.
In other words, what we are witnessing today is not primarily a struc-
tural crisis of the postmodern or neoliberal variant of capitalism. Nor is it 
simply a systemic crisis of capitalism in the traditional Keynesian-Marx-
ist sense of an economic system based on private property, market an-
archy and class domination, leading to an endemic overaccumulation/
underconsumption dynamic and a capital surplus absorption problem 
(see e.g. Harvey 2011 and Bellamy Foster and McChesney 2012). Rather, 
what we are seeing today is the onset of an all-out crisis of the generative 
matrix of capitalist society as such. To be sure, capitalism is beset by a 
growing capital surplus absorption problem – the dilemma that surplus-
es generated in the form of money profit cannot be absorbed productive-
ly by the capital valorisation economy. This is a genuine impasse with 
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disastrous implications, as we have discussed elsewhere (see Feldner 
and Vighi 2015). It is, however, not the central underlying problem of 
the crisis facing us today. Rather than by an absorption problem, the past 
five decades have been defined by an irreversible surplus-value creation 
problem, which is the root cause of our predicament. 
Much classical critical theory of the 20th century was unable to shed 
the widely held assumption that capitalism would create an affluent so-
ciety as it permanently revolutionised the forces of production. Indeed, 
before the 1970s it seemed inconceivable in the West that one day we 
might have to confront not only the dehumanising effects of a “too-
much”, but also and more importantly the fatal consequences of a lack 
of surplus-value, i.e. that the economy of capital valorisation would no 
longer be able to reproduce the socioeconomic infrastructure required to 
maintain the elementary coordinates of social life. 
Today, we will have to rid ourselves of the superstitious thought that 
capitalism creates affluence per se, if only it is managed properly. This 
misconception confuses the exceptional development of a limited num-
ber of countries during the “economic miracle” of the 1950s and 1960s 
with the entire history of capitalism as a social formation. Though capital 
will continue to be accumulated for quite some time, with new forms 
of fictitious capital being created and eagerly embraced as profit-gen-
erating “financial instruments”, it will increasingly suffer a lack of val-
orisation (the expanded reproduction of capital through the competitive 
extraction of surplus-value from human labour). The shortage of new 
surplus-value will eventually undermine the accumulation of capital to 
a degree that the reproduction of society at large becomes a practical 
impossibility (“unaffordable”) at all levels – locally, nationally and glob-
ally. The history of the grow-or-die society is coming to an end. The only 
question is how.
Although Marx did not foresee the secular financialisation of capitalist 
economies during the twentieth century and the attendant devaluation 
of the money medium, his concept of ‘fictitious capital’ goes a long way 
in explaining what is happening today: the accumulation of capital with-
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out value substance that defines the crisis of contemporary capitalism 
and the remedies pursued so far. Our psychoanalytic reference to per-
version captures the crux of the fetishistic illusion that captivates the era 
of financialisation, namely that capital could be valorised without the 
hassle, or scandal, of exploiting wage labour. In other words, that capital 
would have a life beyond labour. Money-begetting-money is the dream 
scenario of capitalist utopia. Needless to say that what we witness today 
is the practical proof of its impossibility. 
If it is true, however, that fictitious capital has come to dominate the 
process of capital valorisation – not temporarily and by accident but ir-
reversibly and by necessity – and that capital accumulation is to an over-
whelming extent already fictitious (i.e. by no means “imagined”, but 
insubstantial), why should we wish to continue to apply the economic 
extraction of money profit as the yardstick for what we consider “effi-
cient”, “realistic” and “affordable”? To question the notions of financial 
affordability, economic efficiency and fiscal realism is far more than a 
hysterical gesture. It is a precondition for transcending the logic of mere 
crisis management. The latter keeps us trapped in a perverse scenario, 
where perishing in the face of plenitude is a distinct possibility.
References
Allen, Katie and Larry Elliott (2016) ‘UK joins Greece at bottom of 
wage growth league’, in The Guardian, 27th July 2016. https://www.
theguardian.com/money/2016/jul/27/uk-joins-greece-at-bottom-of-
wage-growth-league (accessed: 18th September 2016).
Bellamy Foster, John and Robert McChesney (2012) The Endless Crisis: 
How Monopoly-finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the 
USA to China. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Benjamin, Walter (2004) ‘Capitalism as Religion’, in Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W. Jennings (Eds.). Selected Writings Volume I, 1913-
1926. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 288-291.
Carney, Mark (2016) ‘The Spectre of Monetarism’. Governor of the Bank 
of England Speech, 5th December 2016. http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech946.pdf (ac-
cessed: 12th December 2016).
D’Arcy, Conor (2016) ‘The National Living Wage will bring Britain’s 
127Finitude of Capitalism and the Perverse Charm of Denial
need for stronger productivity growth into sharp focus’. http://www.
resolutionfoundation.org/media/blog/the-national-living-wage-will-
bring-britains-need-for-stronger-productivity-growth-into-sharp-fo-
cus/ (accessed: 12th April 2016).
— and Gerwyn Davies (2016) Weighing Up the Wage Floor: Employer Re-
sponses to the National Living Wage. Policy Report of the CIPD and Reso-
lutions Foundation, February 2016. http://www.resolutionfoundation.
org/app/uploads/2016/02/7218-National-Living-Wage-report-WEB.
pdf (accessed: 20th April 2016).
Diamond, Jared (2006) Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fall or Survive. 
London: Penguin.
Economists for Rational Economic Policies (2015) The Cracks Begin to 
Show: A Review of the UK Economy in 2015. By John Weeks, Ann Pettifor, 
Richard Murphy, Özlem Onaran, Jeremy Smith, Andrew Simms and 
Jo Michell. http://www.primeeconomics.org/articles/the-cracks-begin-
to-show-a-review-of-the-uk-economy-in-2015 (accessed: 12 March 
2016).
Feldner, Heiko and Fabio Vighi (2015) Critical Theory and the Crisis of Con-
temporary Capitalism. London and New York: Bloomsbury.
FT (2016) ‘UK facing “dreadful” prospect of 10+ years without real wage 
growth – IFS’, in Financial Times, 24th November 2016. https://www.
ft.com/content/fff859e8-dfed-3ca5-a9c2-7bed527c8c6d (accessed: 28th 
November 2016).
Gordon, Robert J. (2016) The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. 
Standard of Living since the Civil War. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Harvey, David (2011) The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. 
London: Profile Books.
Hutton, Will (2012a) ‘Mervyn King didn’t grasp the crisis then—and he 
doesn’t now’, in The Observer, 6 May 2012, 34. 
— (2012b) ‘Britain’s future lies in a culture of open and vigorous innova-
tion’, in The Observer, 14th October 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/commentisfree/2012/oct/14/will-hutton-britain-innovation-hub (ac-
cessed: 15th October 2012).
IFS (2016) Poverty and Inequality in the UK: 2016. Institute of Fiscal Studies 
report by Chris Belfield, Jonathan Cribb, Andrew Hood and Robert 
Joyce. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. https://www.ifs.org.uk/
publications/8371 (accessed: 25th August 2016).
Jaeger, Carlo C. et. al. (2011) A New Growth Path for Europe: Generating 
Prosperity and Jobs in the Low-Carbon Economy. Final Report. Commis-
sioned by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Potsdam: European Climate Forum. 
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory  |  Vol. 2, No. 2 (April, 2018)128
Jappe, Anselm (2017) The Writing on the Wall: on the Decomposition of Capi-
talism and its Critics. Translated by Alastair Hemmens. Winchester, UK 
and Washington: Zero Books.
Kaletsky, Anatole (2011) Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy. Lon-
don: Bloomsbury.
Kaucher, Linda (2015) ‘How TTIP fits perfectly with the Deregulation 
Act, which can overrule all other laws if they affect growth or cor-
porate interests’. LowImpact.Org, 28th November 2015, http://www.
lowimpact.org/how-ttip-fits-perfectly-with-the-deregulation-act-
which-can-overrule-all-other-laws-if-they-affect-growth-or-corpo-
rate-interests (accessed: 12th July 2016).
Krugman, Paul (2013) End this Depression Now! London and New York: 
W. W. Norton. 
— and Robin Wells (2013) Economics. 3rd edition, New York: Worth Pub-
lishers.
Kurz, Robert (2016) The Substance of Capital. Translated by Robin Halpin. 
London: Chronos.
Lacan, Jacques (1964-65) Seminar XII, Crucial problems for psychoanalysis 
(unpublished in English; all translations are ours).
— (1968-69) Seminar XVI, From an Other to the other (unpublished in En-
glish; all translations are ours).
— (1978) Lacan in Italia / Lacan en Italie 1953-1978. Milan: La Salaman-
dra. English translation by Jack W. Stone. web.missouri.edu/~stonej/
Milan_Discourse2.pdf, accessed 20 November 2016.
— (1997) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III. The Psychoses. New York; 
London: W. W. Norton.
— (1998a) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York; 
London: W. W. Norton.
— (1998b) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX. On Feminine Sexuality. 
The Limits of Love and Knowledge. New York; London: W. W. Norton. 
— (2006) Écrits. The First Complete English Edition. Translated by Bruce 
Fink. New York; London: W. W. Norton.
— (2007) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, The Other Side of Psy-
choanalysis. Translated by Russell Grigg. New York; London: W. W. 
Norton.
Marx, Karl (1976) Capital, vol. 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes. London: Pen-
guin.
— (1991) Capital, vol. 3. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Penguin.
Mason, Paul (2016) Postcapitalism: A Guide to the Future. London: Penguin.
Mathews, John A. (2016) Greening Capitalism. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Mazzucato, Mariana (2014) The Entrepreneurial States: Debunking Public 
129Finitude of Capitalism and the Perverse Charm of Denial
vs. Private Sector Myth. London, New York and Delhi: Anthem Press.
McChesney, Robert and John Nichols (2016) People Get Ready: The Fight 
Against a Jobless Economy and a Citizenless Democracy. New York: Na-
tion Books.
OECD (2015) Towards Green Growth: Tracking Progress. Paris: OECD Pub-
lishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264234437-en (accessed: 13th 
March 2016).
— (2016) OECD Employment Outlook 2016. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2016-en (accessed: 14th Sep-
tember 2016).
Porritt, Jonathon (2012), Capitalism as if the World Matters. Revised edition, 
London and New York: Routledge.
Rifkin, Jeremy (2011) The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power is 
Transforming Energy, the Economy, and the World. New York and Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
— (2014) The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Col-
laborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism. Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Samuelson, Paul (1976) Economics. 10th edition, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Schumpeter, Joseph (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London 
and New York: Routledge.
Schwab, Klaus (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Cologny/Geneva: 
World Economic Forum.
Sohn-Rethel, Alfred (1978) Intellectual and manual labour: A critique of epis-
temology. London: Macmillan.
Srniceck, Nick and Alex Williams (2015) Inventing the Future: Postcapital-
ism and a World Without Work. London: Verso.
Stern, Nicholas (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— (2009a) A Blueprint for a Safer Planet: How to Manage Climate Change and 
Create a New Era of Progress and Prosperity. London: Bodley Head.
— (2009b) ‘The economic crisis and the two great challenges of the 21st 
century’. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wpcontent/up-
loads/2014/03/PPEconCrisisSternMarch09.pdf (accessed: 6th Septem-
ber 2009).
— (2014) ‘Climate change is here now and it could lead to global con-
flict’, in The Guardian, 14th February 2014. http://www.theguardian.
com /environment/2014/feb/13/storms-fl oods-climate-change-upon-
us-lord-stern (accessed: 15th February 2014).
— (2016) Why Are We Waiting? The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling 
Climate Change. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT.
Stiglitz, Joseph (2016) The Great Divide. London: Penguin.
TUC (2016) ‘UK workers experienced sharpest wage fall of any leading 
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory  |  Vol. 2, No. 2 (April, 2018)130
economy’. https://www.tuc.org.uk/economic-issues/labour-market/
uk-workers-experienced-sharpest-wage-fall-any-leading-economy-
tuc (accessed: 5th August 2016). 
UK Deregulation Act (2015). http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/20/
contents/enacted/data.htm (accessed: 19th September 2016).
Žižek, Slavoj (2006) ‘The Fundamental Perversion: Lacan, Dostoyevsky, 
Bouyeri’, in Lacanian Ink, 27: 114 – 129.
— (2017) Incontinence of the Void: Economico-Philosophical Spandrels. Cam-
bridge, MA and London: MIT.
